



Changing Dynamics of Arab Politics with Special Reference to Israel

Maratib Ali Shah¹, Ghulam Mustafa*², Anwar Ali³

¹M.Phil Scholar, Department of Political Science, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.

^{2*} Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.

³ Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.

Corresponding author: ghulammustafa@gcuf.edu.pk

Keywords: Arabs, Dissention, Cooperation, Dynamics

Article	History
Date of Submission:	
22-10-2022	
Date of Acceptance:	
29-12-2022	
Date of Publication:	
31-12-2022	

How to cite?
Shah M.A., Mustafa G., Ali A., (2022). Changing Dynamics of Arab Politics with Special Reference to Israel. *Research Journal for Societal Issues*. 4(1), 128-143.

DOI No: 10.56976/rjsi.v4i1.31

The recent developments in Cooperation between Israel and multiple Arab countries have shaped the dynamics of politics within the Arab region. The centuries-old areas of disagreement have now transformed into different deals of Cooperation. The relationships between Arabs within themselves and the rest of the world have now broken into multiple strands. They are leaving the footprints of their past upon the upcoming areas for Cooperation. This research attempts to understand the various dynamics of these relations among the Arabs in the particular context of Israel, who are the main actors in this region. The research then goes on to critically scrutinize the conflictual historical background of the Arabs and Israelis and then leads towards the recent deals made between the parties. It's a matter of fact that Israel has become a regional power, and Arabs are forced to cooperate with it as both shares a common ground of interests. In this regard, the most important is security and economic Cooperation. The research shall conclude by proving how these developments are beneficial and how they have shaped the dynamics of politics within the Arab region. A mixed approach is used to disentangle the relationship between Changing Dynamics of Arab Politics with the state of Israel.



Introduction

The organization's first Zionist Congress was held in 1897. As the beginning of a growing Jewish and Palestinian involvement in the Palestinian territories, 1897 is a suitable place to start. There are now more Jews than ever, thanks to the Zionist movement's effort to find a new Jewish state in the Palestinian regions under Ottoman rule. Other subjects relating to Jewish immigration to the Palestinian Territories, the conflict's history, and the war in Lebanon are covered in this chapter. Also discussed will be the conflict of 1967. Israel's wins and territorial gains during the match improved its reputation as a Middle Eastern state that is habitable. The 1967 war is the pinnacle of that research, therefore. Over the past 45 years, nations and authorities have defended or contested the geographical lines that the conflict drew. On both sides, the legality of correspondence delivered before or after 1967 has received careful consideration from negotiators and attorneys (Fischbach, 2020).

Since its inception, Israel has been a bone of contention in the Arab region. Several wars have been fought between Israel and Arabs that have resulted in irregularities, power dynamics and instability in the area. Several peace agreements have also been made, but in vain. All of this added to make the Arab region a crisis factory (Black, 2019). Now with the changing dynamics of the modern world, the dynamics within the Arab region have also changed. The reason behind this change is Israel, as it has become a significant regional power (Heller, 2019). Relations between Arabs and Israel are being transformed from rivalry to Cooperation. This research includes several Cooperation deals, focusing on economic and security arrangements.

The U.S. has long prioritised defending Israel while assuring an adequate flow of energy from Arab nations. The balance between the two components has proven to be challenging. Israel has faced ferocious opposition from its Arab neighbours since its founding in 1948, as well as a string of wars that have driven Palestinians from their homes and other conflicts that have never been settled (Fischbach, 2020). Happened Since Harry Truman, US presidents have tried to uphold Israel's and the Arab world's different relationships to prevent hostility between them. Mutual mistrust persists between Israel and its neighbours despite formal peace accords with Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians and temporary agreements (Black, 2019). Distraction in the United States typically entails avoiding the other.

The hostility between Israel and the Arabs is currently diminishing. It should be noted that all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait, have indicated an interest in establishing contacts with Jews in the United States. Israel Yale. These relationships mainly highlight Iran's points of agreement. Israel, the Arabs, and the U.S. all share Iran as a target. Arabs' diplomatic exhaustion due to more than 70 years of conflict with Israel in support of the Palestinians is another encouraging element of ties. The conflict resolution appears far off (Amnon, 2022).



In addition to the political reasons for the Arabs, another reason for this relationship is the fear of depriving Israeli technological innovation in areas from cyber security to desert farming. COVID-19 has also highlighted the Arab's interest in Israeli medical research. The personal security and business contacts between both started years ago. However, today the scope of Israeli-Arab interaction has grown too large to keep it secret for their growth prospects for the future. Deal-making, once strictly done behind the scenes, is now coming openly.

From the visit of Netanyahu to the Oman Palace, the Jewish state is becoming more visible with the development of the Israeli pavilion for the 2018 World Expo in Dubai, which will open in 2021. It's becoming evident how he was previously restrained. With Israeli and UAE air force pilots participating in international drills together, even military collaboration is becoming clear. On Wall Street, the We Work office-sharing company owned by Israeli-American entrepreneur Adam Newman was destroyed by billion-dollar investments from Saudi and Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth funds (Kibrik, 2020). With Israeli billionaire Eden Offer, the majority shareholder of Zem Integrated Shipping Services Limited, Dubai-owned DP World, headed by Chairman Sultan Ahmed bin Saleem, is involved in various collaborative ventures on the high seas. Cooperation in diplomatic efforts is also rising in popularity. Benjamin Netanyahu was one of the first international leaders to publicly emphasize that the killing of Jamal Khashoggi shouldn't be the reason for loneliness in the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's inner circle. The diplomatic community was shocked when Saudi Arabia's envoy to the United States, Princess Reema Bandar Al Saud, sent a card to commemorate Rosh Hashanah in September. On January 28, 2020, a proposal was put up to replace U.S. President Donald J. Trump's "Prosperous Peace" plan, which was pronounced dead upon the arrival of Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority. It seems necessary for the relationship to be "normal." Israel and the Arab governments have it as a secondary objective. Jared Kushner, a top adviser to Trump and his son-in-law, created the strategy.

Crown Prince Abdullah, who was then, consciously created the idea of "minor contacts" between Israel and 57 Islamic nations in Saudi Arabia's 2002 "Arab Peace Initiative," which never had any impact. Palestinians fiercely oppose the idea. The difficulty for Gulf leaders is to engage in negotiations with Israel without making Palestinians look bad (Kibrik, 2020). There is little question that anti-Israel sentiment will be fostered by conservative religious groups in Iran and the Gulf (Haifa, 2021). The governments of Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain are all targets of hostility from Sunni extremists and the Iranian government. After Jordan and Egypt, the UAE was one of the Arab countries that signed a declaration on September 15 2020, to normalize its relations with Israel. The two longtime enemies met to resolve their differences by signing a peace treaty (Haifa, 2021). The agreement between the UAE and the state of Israel to restore peace, diplomatic relations and full normalization, formally known as the Abraham Agreement, was initially signed by the United States-Israel and the United Arab Emirates on August 13, 2020. The UAE was one of the Arab nations that signed a proclamation on September



15, 2020, to normalize its relations with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The two longstanding rivals settled their score by signing a peace agreement. The Abraham Agreement was initially signed on August 13, 2020, by the United States-Israel and the United Arab Emirates. It aims to restore peace, diplomatic ties, and full normalization between the UAE and the state of Israel.

Research Questions

- What were the Dynamics of politics between Arab and Israel in the historical context?
- How is Israel changing the dynamics of politics within the Arab region?
- How will the recent peace developments (Abraham Accord) change the political dynamics of the Arab region?

Changing Dynamics of Arab Politics regarding Israel

The Oslo Accords are a set of accords that were signed in 1993 in Washington, DC, by the Israeli government and the PLO. The Oslo II Treaty, signed in Taba, Egypt, in 1995, also signalled the start of the Oslo Process, a peace effort to reach a settlement based on the UNSCR 242 and 338. Additionally, fulfilling the self-determination right of the Palestinians, It permitted the Parts of the West Bank are now under the administration of the Palestinian Authority, which continues to exercise various types of control over the region. Israel as a whole will take charge. Although these accords may initially seem to be a step towards a more beneficial and cooperative relationship, as the events of the following 20 years demonstrate, it was a strategic choice by Israel to make it a regional power in 1967. since the occupation permitted the unauthorised development of other colonies, Oslo was Israel's best plan, according to Palestinian nationalist Mustafa Barghouti, because it forced them to maintain the free operation. In 1979, Yasser Arafat called Oslo, Norway, to inform the Israelis of a secret channel available.

However, the first intifada, a wave of Palestinian protests, and sporadic violent rioting against Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, didn't start until ten years later, in 1967. Israel has a "window of recognition of security and borders" under UNSCR 242 and 338. According to a joint statement from Israel and the PLO, it was permitted to stay in situ and continue occupying important West Bank locations. The international world pushed Israel to begin negotiations with Palestine. Given that Norway was a Zionist territory as well, secret talks with it proved advantageous.

Additionally, the Arab world was incensed by the PLO's support for Iraq, which made it weaker once Saddam Hussein was overthrown. There was no peace pact in the Oslo Declaration of Principles. Instead, it was intended to create a framework for future discussions regarding establishing an interim rule and a permanent agreement, which will be finished by the end of 1999.



It was scheduled to begin for five years but continued for twenty years. There was essentially no improvement. Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon referred to the region as "forever Israeli territory" in 2000 when the second intifada broke out.

The Arab Peace Initiative, a 10-sentence peace plan that advocated for the reinstatement of the Palestinian state and the designation of Jerusalem as its capital, was introduced in 2002 by the then-King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia—referred to as a "fair answer"—presented to the 3.8 million remaining Palestinian refugees. Some are in the Syrian Golan Heights and southern Lebanon, which Israel occupies. At a conference in Beirut in 2002, 22 Arab League members approved the action. He urged Israel to leave and develop good relations with its Arab neighbours to "live in peace with sensitivity to the rights of every state in the region" by U.N. resolutions 242 and 338.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who used the phrase "normalization" by Syrian forces in both the Arab and Israeli camps, opposed the idea, which U.S. President George W. Bush supported. Open opposition was present. On the same day, the plan was revealed, a Palestinian suicide bomber targeted Netanyahu, inflicting more than 120 injuries while killing 20 people. On March 29, Israel conducted Operation Defense Shield, a significant military operation in the West Bank, in retaliation, resulting in further devastation and casualties.

Before his election in 2003, Sharon declared his support for the long-term relocation of his nation to the Gaza Strip. However, following his victory, he seemed to have changed his stance, stating that the disengagement plan would help minimize terrorism and safeguard Israeli civilians to the greatest extent possible. George W. Bush suggested that Israel "relocate military stations in the Gaza Strip and all Israeli villages and towns" to boost the Israeli economy, raise living standards, and eliminate four unauthorized settlements from the northwest coast.

After the Knesset gave its approval, the procedure got underway in August, with settlers being given pay for evacuation and threatened with broad use of force if they refused to cooperate. At first, the operation was viewed as a highly positive move toward ending the Middle East conflict. Despite the paradox that it started the long-lasting economic siege of Gaza and three more devastating Israeli military operations than ever before in the region's turbulent history, it was "truly a historical precedent." The Palestinians promptly destroyed the final greenhouses in a typical rage.

Despite attempts at achieving mutual and personal advantage, these strategies, plans, and ideas have so far shown to be destructive and spiral out of control, prolonging the war that has lasted for centuries.



Deal for Peace and Normalization: Abraham accord

After Jordan and Egypt, the UAE was one of the Arab countries that signed a declaration on September 15, 2020, to normalize its relations with Israel. The two longtime enemies met to resolve their differences by signing a peace treaty. The agreement between the UAE and the state of Israel to restore peace, diplomatic relations, and full normalization, formally known as the Abraham Agreement, was initially signed by the United States-Israel and the United Arab Emirates on August 13, 2020. This was determined. On October 12 and 15, the Israeli Knesset and cabinet approved the accord. The agreement recognizes each state's sovereignty in addition to the requirement for the two nations to come to bilateral agreements on several matters, such as the exchange of ambassadors and visa policies.

Reasons Behind inclination of Israel and Arabs toward normalization and Cooperation

Several concurrent geopolitical events have influenced the GCC governments' image of Israel as an adversary rather than a possible ally. This shifting perception differs from GCC state to state. In other words, although certain groups of their people are not convinced, royal families feel less threatened than Israel. In any case, there is no assurance that this relationship with Israel is permanent. The pursuit of a normal relationship might be sped up or slowed down by a change in leadership in any Gulf state.

As is frequently the case, leaders' opinions can affect policies toward Israel. Unlike his father, King Salman, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) appears more receptive to fostering better ties with Israel. Due to various circumstances, the dynamics between Israel and the Gulf have evolved. Here are some main reasons that added a lot to bringing the past rivals close to Cooperation in the future while normalizing their ties. The main focus will be on one of the most important Arab countries, the UAE.

Enmity with Iran

One of the primary drivers behind the normalization and collaboration between Arabs and Israelis is Iran. Security concerns around Iran have rekindled old rivalries. The collective loyalty of the GCC members is in doubt for Tehran during the rule of the governments of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Khomeini because each GCC member and Iran differ significantly in terms of size, population, and national identity. Iran and the GCC shared the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s pro-Western foreign policy movements. Still, they were unable to come to terms with a system of regional security. The so-called Twin Pillars policy required Saudi Arabia and Iran to work together to preserve Western interests in their territories. If it ever had any merit, it didn't last long. Tehran's hatred of its Arab neighbors grew after the Iranian revolution in 1979. During the Iran-



Iraq War, most GCC nations gave Saddam Hussein substantial financial support. Since Iraq invaded Kuwait, administrations on both sides of the Persian Gulf have been unable to reconcile due to historical and physical limitations. Since the late 20th century, the GCC governments have lost faith in the capabilities and objectives of the Islamic Republic because of Iran's expanding influence in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.

It's unlikely that Iran and the Arab world's strategic partnership will end soon. By proposing to cooperate with GCC members to disrupt Iran's missile, cyber, and nuclear programmers, Israel might capitalize on their longstanding hatred of one another.

Compulsion in Turkey's Perception

Similar to Iran, Turkey has the potential to either improve regional security or further destabilize the Middle East. In contrast to Tehran, Ankara has a majority Sunni population, but this is insufficient to foster trust between Turkey and some GCC nations. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire continues to complicate Turkish-Arab relations today. It is crucial to keep in mind that the forebears of modern Saudi Arabia rebelled against Ottoman rule and supported the British during World War I.

While the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam are viewed as threats to existence in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, respectively, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a staunch friend of the Muslim Brotherhood in several Arab nations, including Egypt and Libya. Turkey and the United Arab Emirates have recently supported rebel forces in Libya's civil conflict. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates contend with Qatar and the Horn of Africa for influence. The GCC's disagreements with other nations on political and ideological grounds cast doubt on Ankara's intentions. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, along with Egypt and Bahrain, are vehemently opposed to Turkey's expanding influence and presence throughout the Arab and Muslim world. In essence, the rulers of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have doubts about Iran and Turkey's motives. Israel seeks to profit from this opening. Erdogan desires to end the Gaza Strip naval blockade and expand his influence over the holy sites in East Jerusalem by portraying himself as the Palestinians' defender and the animosity between Erdogan and Netanyahu (Ferzinger & Hodali, 2018).

Mistrust in United States' Commitment to Gulf Security

Since the 1980s, U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf has been governed by Carter's doctrine, which asserts that the U.S. will support the GCC states against any foreign assault. George H.W. Bush, a former U.S. president, had no qualms about sending U.S. soldiers to liberate Kuwait in 1990. The capitals of the Gulf states are now in danger due to recent statements and actions by the U.S.



administration. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the most strenuous defender of the regional deadlock was replaced by the biggest challenger to the status quo. Former U.S. Secretary of State Saud al-Faisal has cautioned the George W. Bush administration against attacking Iraq. According to several GCC nations, the fall of the Sunni government in Baghdad made Iran stronger while weakening Arab Sunni governments. The GCC governments were concerned by Obama's plan for rapprochement between the Iranian and Arab peoples when former U.S. President Obama's administration attempted to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran without the participation of the Arab community. Before departing the White House, Obama made a public appeal for Saudi Arabia to "learn how to split the Persian Gulf with Iran."

The GCC's fears about U.S. foreign policy toward Iran have not been allayed despite Trump's close links to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Whether it's a good idea or not, Trump has been very explicit about his desire to exit the Middle East. Whatever its goals, the United States is viewed as a fantastic friend. Washington's ire over Riyadh's decision to flood the global market with cheap oil in early April 2020 illustrates the increasing breach between the two former allies. Leaders of the GCC think they can't rely on Washington for security (Wechsler, 2019).

Division among Palestinians

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been a continuous source of unrest in the region. However, it is important not to undermine this conflict's part in the rivalry among the regional powers regarding strategy. Of course, most Arab nations and people support the creation of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and a settlement for the refugees. It is referred to as the official Arab perspective, which the Arab League and the Arab governments in the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 have reaffirmed. However, most Arab countries, particularly those in the Persian Gulf, do not make it a high strategic priority to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. These states are weary and disappointed with the escalating racial conflicts and the protracted conflicts between Palestinian factions and authorities. From the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Palestinians have used nationalist, Marxist, and Islamist languages in various contexts and through multiple tactics. For instance, nationalist, leftist, and Islamist inclinations were represented by the PLO and Hamas. The PLO leader believes that Arafat's support for Saddam's war on Kuwait was a historical error.

Some Palestinian factions responded by rejecting the agreements reached in Oslo with Israel. Despite these miraculous qualities, Arafat could not subdue all of the Palestinians, which resulted in the allegiance of a sizable number of his supporters. The gap has grown since his passing in 2004, and Palestinian animosity toward Hamas and the Palestinian Authority has taken on a symbolic significance. Different Palestinian political philosophies and socioeconomic situations are emerging in the West Bank and Gaza.



Since 2007, the Palestinian Authority has failed to make any successful attempts to end the conflict, keeping Gaza under the leadership of Hamas. Because of the broadening and deepening of the Palestinian divide and the absence of a clear strategic direction, some GCC officials are hesitant to use political and financial resources to resolve the Arab-Israeli issue. Israel today has greater legitimacy as a result of this slender support. Most Arabs agree with Israel's assertion that Palestine has no allies with whom to engage. Growing tensions between the Palestinians and the GCC nations resulted from the Palestinians' refusal to accept medical supplies at Ben Gurion International Airport on a flight from Abu Dhabi to Tel Aviv in May 2020 (HELLER, 2019).

Israel's Technological advancement

Israel's tremendous military and technological advancements have altered Arab opinions of the Jewish state. The Middle East's most powerful conventional and unconventional military capabilities are found in this state. Israel's conventional forces outnumber its neighbors, including Egypt, while being outnumbered numerically. Utilize cutting-edge technology and training to make up for this imbalance. The nation is well known for being the only nuclear power in the Middle East.

Due to massive private technical investment, Israel has the most advanced cyberspace infrastructure globally, surpassing China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This is in addition to its traditional military prowess. Another field where Israel has established itself as a leading supplier and manufacturer is crewless aerial vehicles or drones. Israel is a global leader in several commercial technologies, including water management, irrigation, and military prowess. Water scarcity is a significant issue in the majority of Arab nations, particularly those that border the Persian Gulf. Since the early 1990s, Israel and other Arab countries have been working together covertly in this one of the few sectors. Israel has grown more appealing as a partner for GCC nations looking to advance their security and economic objectives due to its advancements and innovations in both military and civilian technologies (Bahgat, 2007).

The underlying principles of Arab and Israeli collaboration

Despite their geography, ideology, and political disparities, Israel and the UAE share interests that might promote closer Cooperation. The two nations have comparable political and security objectives at the regional and global levels in terms of trade, technology, resources, and expertise, as well as addressing and shared environmental challenges. Following are the grounds on which the Arabs and Israeli can cooperate.



Political and security grounds

Israel's ambition to increase its legitimacy in the Middle East is its primary motivation for closer ties with the UAE. Israel has been longing for potential friends in the region because of the overall hostile environment against it, and the UAE seems to be a nation that can promote that objective.

The UAE is interested in strengthening its relationship with Israel to dominate the area. As a moderate Arab-Muslim nation, the UAE approaches improving ties with Israel more pragmatically than ideologically. As the UAE is a more stable state among the other Arab countries in the political, economic, and social spheres, this enables it to participate in long-term planning and implementation.

Israel wishes to develop its relations with nations like the United Arab Emirates because political stability is essential to progressing and stabilizing the peace process. Although it has participated in and supported existing projects, the UAE has not yet spearheaded any Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative. The Palestinian leader who succeeds Mahmoud Abbas might encourage the UAE to play a role in advancing the peace talks (especially if it were Mohammed Dahlan, who has the full support of the UAE). Strategic solid connections with the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Bahrain are necessary for Israel to achieve its regional goals. Regional peace will be aided by Israel's close ties to any of these nations.

The UAE and Israel share similar political concerns over two pressing issues: Iranian nuclear proliferation and Islamization. Israel and the United Arab Emirates both disagree with Iranian nuclear proliferation and the nuclear agreement. In 2013 Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu described the nuclear agreement as a "regional menace" that also affects Arab countries and a chance for a new collaboration, noting that Israel has connections to the larger Arab world. Shared problems and interests should shape the future of peace, we hope. Some claim that the UAE and other Gulf nations prefer active hostilities against Iran. Stay out of it and observe Israel wage its diplomatic conflict.

In any case, Cooperation between the two nations might be sparked by the Iranian threat, ideally leading to improved diplomatic ties, intelligence sharing, or even an escalation of hostilities. A joint military operation might take place. Another ground for Cooperation is the threat posed by terrorist groups and wider radical inclinations. Israel and the UAE consider extremist organizations such as Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates a security threat to its stability. Following assistance from terrorist groups and individuals, the UAE and other nations announced in June 2017 that they were cutting off relations with Qatar. The UAE's disagreement with Qatar's stance on Al Jazeera T.V. during its coverage of the 2008–2009 war in the Arab Spring and Gaza is at the centre of the issue with Qatar (called "Operation Cast Lead"). This alone is a sign of Israel and the UAE's shared values and objectives (Guzansky & Marshall, 2020).



Economic grounds

Because of the success of its port, Jabal Ali, which is regarded as the biggest and most significant in the region, the UAE is a powerful economic force in the Middle East. It is a fact that the economy of any state depends upon its imports and exports, which play a vital role. The UAE received an estimated 700 billion NIS in imports from various nations in 2016. The growing ties between Israel and UAE will open up new dimensions of Cooperation by commercial routes, such as for the goods of UAE to the West and the Mediterranean region and Israeli exports to the east. The two nations can profit from bilateral trade and their inherent capacity to establish new trade routes to other areas of the world.

Israel's technical know-how and the UAE's energy resources can help facilitate cooperation ventures that advance trade interests on both sides thanks to the two nations' enormous comparative advantages. In contrast, several sectors of the economy in the global market are pretty small. Additionally, during the past ten years, the UAE has expanded its domestic manufacturing capability, increasing the likelihood that Israeli products will be allowed access to the UAE market.

The UAE's tremendous growth in infrastructure, building, real estate, and diverse projects presents many alternatives for foreign investors and international firms. The possible participation of Israeli companies in such schemes may have a substantial economic impact on Israel (Haifa, 2021).

Civil grounds

There may be some civic characteristics to any potential cooperation between the two nations. In times of peace, Muslim countries, like the United Arab Emirates, may travel for religious reasons to visit Israel's sacred sites. The UAE and Israel have embraced the ideals like religious tolerance, and religion plays a significant role in daily life and politics in both nations. Through interfaith conversation and more possibilities for competitiveness between Jews and Muslims, the two countries can also build their distinct culture of religious tolerance while cooperating in this sector. However, it should be highlighted that expanding tourism between the two nations in this regard would not be beneficial in terms of economy as both populations are tiny. The medical sector is another area with potential for Cooperation. The UAE, struggling to enhance its capacity in the medical industry, may find Israel's medical advancement in medical equipment, knowledge, and experts appealing. Israel can benefit from the resources of the UAE, and the UAE may benefit from the capabilities that Israel has amassed over the years. The exchange of shared grounds like labour, technology, goods, and knowledge is significant for both countries. Environmental concerns can benefit from the technological and developmental goals the two nations are pursuing (Kibrik, 2020).



Israel is well aware of the challenging weather conditions of the UAE, which have driven the nation to look for cutting-edge technology solutions to handle the country's problems with a lack of fresh water, deserts, and extremely high temperatures. The two nations have built sizable desalination plants and are working to develop innovative ways to harness solar energy and raise environmental consciousness. Both countries strive to set an example for worldwide scientific advancement in this area and are gradually moving toward the usage of alternative and renewable energy. Al-Masdar, a city constructed in Abu Dhabi on the scientific basis of "zero waste and zero carbon," is the most conspicuous illustration of this aim. In conclusion, there is a shared desire to strengthen ties between Israel and the UAE in several areas. The political-security sphere is the most crucial area for Cooperation because it may help both states become more resilient and work together to counter the Iranian threat. Due to the UAE's increasing participation in world politics and the economy, Israel is interested in fortifying its connections with this country. In a region that was primarily hostile towards Israel, the UAE can be proved an easy and helpful ally for Israel because it is a moderate, accepting, and pragmatic state.

Mutual interests of both countries may push them for Cooperation for UAE, there is attraction and longing for Israeli advanced technological innovations in the fields of medicine, agriculture, and armament, and for Israel, this may be of its acceptance and legitimization in the region. Additionally, new opportunities would be created for the Emiratis, possibly strengthening regional stability. On the other hand, Israel is more interested in upholding these ties than the United Arab Emirates in general. Many nations and businesses worldwide, including Israel, are drawn to the UAE because of its substantial political and economic advantages. In pursuing these numerous prospects, Israel must contend with fierce rivalry from other nations for recognition with the UAE (Singer, 2021).

Spheres in which Cooperation is being existed earlier

Although relations between Israel and the Emirates are less intense in the political and civil realms, they nonetheless exist on various levels, particularly in the economic and security domains. Multilateral forums are primarily used for the sparse collaboration in these areas. There is essentially little information to the people about the existing Cooperation between states in numerous industries, including academics, journalism, tourism, aviation, and culture.

Political Sphere

The UAE and Israel don't have any formal diplomatic ties. The occasional contacts between officials from the two countries remain unknown to the general public. For instance, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan met



secretly during the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September 2012. The summit was conducted a short time later because both nations wished to halt Iran's nuclear program. The former D.G. of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Dor Gold, visited the United Arab Emirates in November 2015 to open the Israeli mission office at the UN IRENA is another illustration of direct and covert encounters with high officials that can be talked about. Although the visit's primary focus was on agency collaboration under an international framework, it also opened up avenues for direct communication between nations, albeit in secret (Black, 2019).

According to state media, the UAE's strategy on relations with Israel is unclear. For instance, the official press in the United Arab Emirates decided not to report on the beginning of the Israeli mission in Abu Dhabi in early 2016. The Emirati media, however, reacted negatively to the agency's launch because it was widely reported by Jewish and worldwide press. In a formal statement, Maryam Khalifa, Head of Communications and press at the UAE MoFA, said that IRENA is an international organization with its laws and regulations and that the mission's inauguration is by those standards. It does not represent the UAE's position on the matter or the evolution of the bilateral relationship. Israeli authorities visited the United Arab Emirates to offer gratitude for the founding of IRENA in Abu Dhabi. Ministers for National Infrastructure Silvan Shalom, Energy Minister Yovel Steinz, and Minister for Infrastructure Uzi Landau were the most senior Israeli delegates that attended the agency's conferences and meetings.

International conventions and conferences in the UAE are typically open to Israeli government representatives. To attend an IMF conference, a sizable Israeli delegation of about 80 people traveled directly from Israel to the United Arab Emirates in 2003. The plane made a direct landing in Dubai. The panel included former minister Mir Sheitrit, David Klein, governor BOI, and a few businesses. In 2016, Danny Danen, the Israeli ambassador to the U.N. and chair of the U.N. legal committee, made an official trip to the United Arab Emirates.

Security Sphere

Security cooperation is also characterized by the absence of concrete relations between the two nations. Information about Israel and the UAE's security cooperation is often ambiguous. However, some Israeli and international media sites have claimed that collaboration between the two nations consists of participating in multilateral military exercises and exchanging information and weapons. According to several recent reports, Israel's drone and army weapon technology are intensely interested in the UAE. The Air Force shares a distinctive military interest. According to media reports, the two air forces participated in at least three global military drills. The start of extraordinary Cooperation between the two nations came in July 2018 when a military delegation from the Emirati visited Jerusalem to inspect F-35 warplanes that Israel had purchased from the U.S. The UAE wanted to bolster its air force, which is why this happened.



Economic Sphere

Compared to the other forms of Cooperation listed above, trade cooperation between states is the most important. However, the majority of international transactions are kept under wraps. The business community serves as a venue for public gatherings because, in contrast to the government, it may maintain a low profile and interact with non-mediators. Additionally, business partners can communicate openly even if there are no official diplomatic ties between the two countries. The majority of business cooperation occurs in the United Arab Emirates. Regardless of whether they have Israeli or foreign passports, Israeli businesses enter the country through regional emirates. Goods exchanges and business agreements between organizations working on joint projects in Israel and the United Arab Emirates are economic cooperation examples. Israeli businesses typically work on projects in the UAE through entities registered in other nations. Instead of imports from the UAE, trade relations are centered on exports from Israel. Medical devices, military items, consultancy in different areas like agriculture, and products related to food are among the exports being made by Israel to the UAE. To keep the country of origin as secret as possible, goods are transported via another state and do not contain a Hebrew label or trademark.

Israeli businesses operating in the UAE have revealed that, while generally appreciative of Cooperation with Jews and Israelis, Emirati firms are nevertheless wary of it. Trade with Israel is prohibited in some UAE bids, but this prohibition is frequently not upheld. Both nations are planning how to get beyond these hurdles. Current trade interactions encounter challenges in all spheres, including getting registered, courier, and remittances. The media occasionally covers business collaboration in a variety of industries; here are a few instances:

- To secure the oil and natural gas industries and monitor the nation's borders, the Abu Dhabi government hired Israeli millionaire Mati Kochuvi's AGT International. AGT works with local business people in the UAE while conducting business as a foreign organization. AGT provides technology and professionals from Israel. The store was opened by an Israeli group Lev Leviev in Dubai, which deals in diamonds.
- Joint ventures between Yitzhak Tsuva (an Israeli businessman) and UAE officials, including building Tshuva's Plaza Hotel in UAE and other countries.
- Trade cooperation in shipping between the Israeli Brothers Group and the United Arab Emirates. Talks by business between Israeli Benny Steinmetz and UAE officials.

Following Al-murder Mabhouh's in January 2010, commercial ties between the two nations dwindled for a while and were maintained under wraps and discretion. It is unknown how extensive or effective these partnerships were between 2010 and 2015. In the UAE, AGT was revived in 2016. It created a system of widespread surveillance (Ferzinger & Waldman, 2017).



Civil Sphere

There is virtually little civil Cooperation between both states. Information about Cooperation in the civil fields is scarce. Under the aegis of international non-governmental organizations and various U.N. agencies, there is some cooperation between the residents of the two nations. Still, it is impossible to gauge the significance of their reach. Sports represent a noteworthy exception to this narrow definition of collaboration. Israel's participation in international sporting events is complicated by the UAE's rising desire to host such events. Israeli athletes were not permitted to visit the UAE as of 2010. However, the UAE eventually let them participate, with a low profile in the media, following protests from the world community and the prospect of losing the right to hold international events. For instance, an Israeli tennis player who had previously declined to participate in a tournament in Dubai was permitted to play in the city on a Monday in February 2010. Peer's remarkable visit to the UAE was widely reported in the media and hampered the UAE's goal to maintain it less covered. The Emirate decided to lift the restriction on Israeli players competing in the tournaments, subject to them not donning any national anthem while on tour.

The Israeli judo squad was thus permitted to compete in the yearly judo championship organized in UAE, which started in October 2015. When asked about the competition's preparations, Moshe Ponty, the head of the Judo Association of Israel, said, "I have done my best to fight in Abu Dhabi. "I have remained in touch with the officials to contest in Abu Dhabi." The Israeli and worldwide media had to be kept out of the picture for the visa to be approved. It was a very tough undertaking in and of itself and did not reflect international Cooperation in regional sporting events. A cycling team from Emirates took part in the International Cycling Competition in May 2018, which had its opening in Israel. With its governmental symbol, the UAE team participated formally. International sports federations are crucial for establishing international ties and spotting the trend of openness. In July 2018, the IJA prohibited the UAE from holding future judo competitions in response to restrictions on Israeli competitors. Because of the statement, the UAE permitted Israeli athletes to fly their national flags this time. The Israeli national anthem was played in Abu Dhabi following Sagie Mickey's gold-medal victory in the Judo Grand Slam in October 2018 (STAFF, 2015).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The recent dynamical change in Arab politics because of collaboration with Israel shows that a significant transformation in the Arabs' political system is not out of the question. Israel has undeniably grown into a powerful regional force in the Middle East, one whose economy and cutting-edge technology capabilities have the potential to alter the political landscape of the Arab world. Putting aside the Palestinian conflict, Israel has developed some relationships with



significant regional nations. Palestine's main problem can also be appropriately remedied. Palestine, refugees, and the holy place Jerusalem issues can be addressed directly by negotiating between Israel and the Arab governments, and it would be more straightforward. More settlements might hamper progress in the West Bank and Netanyahu's plan to occupy another Jordan Valley. It must thus be overcome since, according to the Palestinians, doing so would amount to actual annexation and rule out any chance of a two-state solution. It's feasible that a similar action wouldn't preclude Israelis and Arabs from working together in the commercial world. This might, however, impede progress and undermine public support for further collaboration. It would be erroneous to believe that the Arabs' decision to collaborate would allow for the eradication of Israel's Satanism, which has persisted in the region for nearly 75 years. The research shows that factors like science, culture, business, economy and security concerns have contributed a lot to bringing the Israelis and Arabs close together, from great animosity to Cooperation with each other.

Recommendations

- The capabilities in the areas of science, technology, security, economic sphere, and desert farming should be promoted to Arabs by Israel.
- Giving the Palestine issue due consideration, the U.S. must play its vital role in bringing stability and prosperity to the region while brokering more peace agreements.
- The concerns of the Palestinian officials must be addressed who are of the view that the U.S. has favored Israel in this accord.
- Arab states can advance the peace process by pledging financial support for infrastructure and commercial ventures in the Palestinian state.
- A railing network between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf will be built to promote trade between GCC countries and Israel. It would enhance the ties between them more robust.
- Tools of diplomacy like educational exchange programs, academic scholarships, promoting games, cultural exchange programs, and promoting tourism should be exercised to bring the masses together to make the peace deal more efficient and effective.
- Mutually combatting COVID-19 by Arabs and Israelis has shown that Mutual interest must be promoted so that political hurdles are broken down.

References

Amnon, C. (2022). Trump and Israel. *Israel Studies*, 27(1), 156-181.

Bahgat, G. (2007). *Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*. Panama: Florida Scholarship Online.



Black, I. (2019). *Just below the surface: Israel, the Arab Gulf States and the limits of Cooperation*. London: London School of Economics.

Ferzinger, J. H., & Hodali, F. (2018, September 20). *Turkey's Erdogan Is All Over East*. Retrieved 12 14, 2022, from Bloomberg.com.

Ferzinger, J. H., & Waldman, P. (2017, February 02). *How Do Israel's Tech Firms Do Business in Saudi Arabia? Very Quietly*. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from Bloomberg.com: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-02-02/how-do-israel-s-tech-firms-do-business-in-saudi-arabia-very-quietly>

Guzansky, Y., & Marshall, Z. (2020). The Abraham Accords: Immediate significance and long-term implications. *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 14(3), 379-389.

Haifa, A. (2021). The Economic Implications of the Israel-UAE Normalization Agreement in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and the Potential Impacts on the GCC. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, 15(4), 554-570.

Heller, A. (2019, February 14). *Arab leaders play down Palestinian issue in leaked video*. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from AP.com: <https://apnews.com/article/12eab3b948bb415e9f6300601be9939b>

Kibrik, ., R. (2020). The Unrealized Potential of Israel's Relations with Arab States: Regional Cooperation Hindered by the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. *A Multidisciplinary Journal on National Security*, 23(3), 130-135.

Singer, I. J. (2021). The Abraham Accords: Normalization Agreements Signed by Israel with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. *International Legal Materials*, 60(3), 448-463.

Staff, T. (2015, November 1). *Israeli judokas win medals in Abu Dhabi, but without flag*. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from Times of Israel.

Wechsler, W. F. (2019). *U.S. Withdrawal from the Middle East: Perceptions and Reality*. Washington D.C: Atlantic Council.