Framing a Cosmopolitan Common Mind Approach for Global Challenges

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This article posits and defends an argument that a cosmopolitan common mind approach is essential for resolving global challenges that cannot be resolved by individuals working independently from one another, such as achieving global peace, cleaning the environment, and improving public health. A 'cosmopolitan common mind' refers to an intersubjective recognition across states, cultures, or continents. This argument of the cosmopolitan common mind is centred on Philip Pettit's theory of the common mind and ethical cosmopolitanism. Pettit argues that a common mind is a shared mind. The standard account of cosmopolitanism claims all human beings are members of the human community. This account is based on three key ideals: individualism, egalitarianism, and universalism. Cosmopolitanism considers individuals rather than nations or states, giving them equal moral status across the world without any discrimination. A cosmopolitan common mind can direct collective action across cultures or continents to resolve global problems. Terrorism and climate change are global problems that are not the products of individual actions but collective actions. For instance, pollution is created by many people working together. If people all together create pollution, they all together can stop it. The problems of establishing global peace and clean ecology are similar to preventing pollution because they are beyond the ability of any lone individual to solve. If it is not impossible, there is a need to develop a cosmopolitan common mind to acquire the common good. The research concludes that the cosmopolitan common mind approach can be a promising framework for resolving contemporary challenges. In qualitative research methodology, I use empirically informed philosophical analysis to critically evaluate documentary resources, including journal papers, academic books, and the proceedings of conferences and congresses.
1. Introduction

This article develops and defends the idea of a *cosmopolitan common mind approach* that could direct global collective action for resolving global challenges, such as achieving global peace, cleaning the environment, and improving public health, which may not be resolved by individuals working independently from one another. Most global problems are not the products of some individual actions but the combined effect of many actors. Collective actions under a shared mind may bring about a large-scale social change. For instance, pollution is created by collective actions. If many people all together create pollution, then they all together can stop it (Hardin, 1982, p. 1). The problem of establishing global peace is similar to that of preventing pollution in that they are beyond the ability of any lone individual to solve it. Amartya Sen argues that no magic bullet could create global peace. A broad vision can identify the ostensible and hidden factors that affect human life (Sen, 2008). Sen acknowledges that this violence-ridden world needs an inclusive vision for peaceful co-existence. Like Sen, Popper argues that if bad intellectuals are a source of violence, good intellectuals can defuse it. Popper states that do not set humans against humans, even with good intentions. This is not an impossible thing to do (Popper, 1992; Popper, 2000). If it is not impossible, as Popper argues, we must develop a cosmopolitan common mind to promote the good and stop the bad.

The idea of a cosmopolitan common mind is drawn from Pettit’s theory of common mind and cosmopolitanism. Pettit’s theory of the common mind is about how people can understand one another and reach an agreement among themselves (Pettit, 1996). Pettit assumes that people can develop common minds with a group, society, or state (Pettit, 1996). I consider the possibility that human persons have an even greater capacity to develop common minds across divergent cultures and between continents. This idea is supported by the theory of cosmopolitanism, and accordingly, I call common minds that have such a global reach, ‘cosmopolitan common minds’. I contrast them with what I call ‘parochial common minds,’ which extend only across the people in localised places. A key part of my argument is that where the nature of a problem or conflict is global, a cosmopolitan common mind is required to resolve the problem or the conflict.

To make a distinction between a cosmopolitan common mind approach and a cosmopolitan common mind is pertinent. A ‘cosmopolitan common mind approach’ is a general, open-ended, and broad strategy. I use Cass R. Sunstein’s idea of an *incompletely theorized agreement* to explain the notion of the cosmopolitan common mind approach. Sunstein provides two examples of an incompletely theorised agreement: First, people may
agree on a general principle that endangered species should be saved. However, they may disagree on different justifications of the claim. Like incompletely theorised agreement, a ‘cosmopolitan common mind approach is general. A ‘cosmopolitan common mind’ means inter-subjective recognition of something across borders, cultures, or continents. The significant point is that under the umbrella of a cosmopolitan common mind approach, there can be developed numerous cosmopolitan common minds to address different challenges. For instance, to address the problem of decaying ecology, a cosmopolitan common mind is required which could direct global collective action to enhance a clean environment. To resolve the problem of pandemic diseases, a cosmopolitan common mind is required to improve the conditions of public health. To explain the idea of a cosmopolitan common mind approach further, I use the example of the United Nations undergoing two projects: the first is the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The second is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN General Assembly approved SDGs in 2015 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. These projects adopt a general approach what I call the cosmopolitan common mind approach. Among the 17 goals of the Sustainable Development Goal No. 16 states, “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (United Nations, 2015, p. 14). A cosmopolitan common mind is vital to address this particular goal of peace. I hold that this particular cosmopolitan common mind is reverence for humanity.

2. Literature Review and Research Methodology

This research deals with the problem of global collective action and its underpinning shared minds. In this section, I review the essential literature on collective action at national and cosmopolitan levels. The problem of collective action and its associated idea (cosmopolitan) common mind has several forms and facets. In his work, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics, Philip Pettit posits the idea of the common mind. Pettit holds that a ‘common mind’ means a shared mind, which is neither an “insulated” nor a “solipsistic” property (Pettit, 1996). This shared mind is created by people through mutual interactions (Pettit, 1996). Pettit argues that “one individual is minded entails that others are minded too; no mind in this common sense, without a society of minds” (Pettit 1996, 342). This means that people’s minds are wired with thoughts. Margaret Gilbert (1994) criticises Pettit’s The Common Mind by stating that it fails to explain “what there is in the social arena?” (Gilbert 1994, 562). However, Gilbert’s question, ‘what there is in the social arena’ seeks ample explanation about the nature of the substance existing in a society, of which Pettit called
‘the common mind’. There is, perhaps, no doubt in asserting that the substance of the common mind is ‘thought’. It embodies the common mind. Clifford Geertz would have responded to Gilbert’s question that “[t]hought is what goes on in our heads” (Geertz 1983, 148).

Pettit develops a social holist position. In Defining and Defending Social Holism (1998), Pettit holds that individuals are social beings who share the common property in their social lives (Pettit, 1998, 170). This claim stands against the thesis of social atomism that supports solitary life. Moreover, in Joining the Dots (2007), Pettit reiterates that social interaction is not only necessary for ratiocination but also for identifying an objective referent and its applications in social life. He argues that mutual interactions produce thought, and make communication possible, which promotes a sense of personal responsibility in people. Thus, social interactions give meaning to social life: out of social life, one “would be like trying to clap with one hand” (Pettit 2007, 336).

Aristotle and Ralf Dahrendorf support social holism. For instance, in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that human beings are social in nature (Aristotle 2000, 177). Dahrendorf uses the expression, ‘homo sociologicus’ which also means that ‘humans are social’ (Dahrendorf 1965). In contrast to homo sociologicus, the expression ‘homo economicus’ assumes that human beings are economically rational. This approach is identical to many conceptions of the abstract individual, such as false individualism or atomic individualism. The concept of homo economicus assumes that individuals are self-interested by nature. Amartya Sen calls this concept ‘the rational fool’ (Sen, 1977).

In her work, Joint Commitment (2014), Margaret Gilbert states that “[the] social world, the world of conversations, friendships, marriages, sports teams, discussion groups, religious orders, partisans, citizens, and so on,” (Gilbert 2014, 4) cannot be understood in the singularist terms. What Gilbert describes as ‘singularist’ accounts of social phenomena is one version of individualism. Joint commitments / collective action is required to resolve challenges. In The Country of First Boys and Other Essays, Sen writes, “Injustice, inequality, poverty, hunger, tyranny, ignorance, exclusion, exploitation: there are many ailments that ravage the modern world. We have reason enough to be determined and resolute in fighting them” (Sen, 2016, 55). Sen justifies a joint commitment to eradicate such evils.

Similarly, in Lesson of this Century, Popper states that freedom needs intellectual responsibility. Popper holds that intellectuals deal with ideas. “Mass extermination in the name of an idea, a doctrine, a theory—that is our work, our invention, the invention of intellectuals. If we stopped stirring people up against one another—often with the best intentions—that alone
would do a great deal of good” (Popper 2000, 86). Margaret Gilbert in her recent work, *Life in Groups: How We Feel, Think, and Act Together* (2023), deals with the problem of collective action (Gilbert, 2023). She holds that “groups of people” refers to “classes, populates, mobs, legislatures, courts, faculties, student bodies, and so on,” adding shortly after “kindergartners” and “legislators” (Gilbert, 2013). Gilbert also explains another ‘social group’ in the sense of “racial, ethnic and gender groups” along with families, teams, clubs, among other examples” (Gilbert, 2023). Thus, Pettit, Popper, and Gilbert are the significant scholars who defend the social holist thesis.

In this paper, I employ the method of empirically informed philosophical analysis, in the purview of qualitative research, to critically evaluate the documentary resources comprising academic books, journal papers, proceedings of congresses, and conferences on the problem of collective action at the parochial and cosmopolitan levels. This research is argumentative, analytical, and critical. The findings of the research are presented in the form of philosophical arguments.

3. Philip Pettit’s Theory of the Common Mind

The problem of rule-following is the crux of Pettit’s theory of the common mind. Although Ludwig Wittgenstein discussed the idea of rule-following in his book, *Philosophical Investigations* (1958), Saul Kripke in his work, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1982), introduced the idea to contemporary philosophy. Drawing on Kripke’s idea of rule-following, Pettit explicates his theory of the common mind. By ‘rule-following,’ Pettit means that individuals conform to what others do because they acquire the capacity of identification in social interaction. A ‘capacity of identification’ means the ability to conform to the behavioural patterns of others. He argues that rationality plays a vital role in following rules. Pettit develops a novel account of Wittgenstein’s idea of rule-following and Wittgenstein’s argument against private rules. Regarding the question Wittgenstein poses as to what is involved in either following a rule or going against it, Pettit argues that to follow a rule, it is necessary to know how to “go on” with it correctly (Pettit, 1996, p. 89). There are different possibilities on how to proceed with it, and one must somehow decide which is correct. Significantly, Pettit argues that thinking subjects hold an “extrapolative disposition” which helps to “go on” with a rule in a particular way under given circumstances (Pettit, 1996, p. 89). An ‘extrapolative disposition’ means that a particular rule, which has been applied in particular situations under certain circumstances in the past, can be applied to other similar situations under similar circumstances. This extrapolative disposition is, however, not sufficient for
following a rule because there is a possibility of committing a mistake. To follow a rule correctly, there is a need to have some check on the extrapolative disposition. Pettit declares two necessary checks on following a correct rule: interpersonal consistency and commonable rules (Pettit, 1990, p. 15-6).

‘Interpersonal consistency’ means regularity of social interactions with one another: that is, consistency among different people. In contrast, ‘intrapersonal consistency’ means that the same person acts in the same way at different times. For following rules correctly, Pettit emphasises an interpersonal consistency that involves negotiations with other persons. These ‘negotiations with other people’ involve what Pettit calls ‘social interaction.’ Pettit asserts that for it to be possible to follow the rules correctly, the rules in question must be “commonable” (Pettit, 1996, p. 180). The expression ‘commonable’ refers to thoughts that are accessible to other people. Pettit argues that no individual can develop a monopoly on commonable rules because people recognise them as common possessions (Pettit, 1996, p. 180).

Pettit states that only some rules are commonable (Pettit, 1996, p. 182). Commonable rules emerge out of interpersonal interactions with others. If one follows a rule that is intrapersonal or intertemporal, the rule is not commonable (Pettit, 1996, p. 184). The essence of the commonability thesis is that we understand the world with the help of a common social reality. A social reality contains properties and the only properties that can be accessible in it are those which are accessible to others. This means that common properties are accessible to people. These common properties create common rules of thought that help people to understand the social world (Pettit, 1996, p. 353).

Commonable thoughts depend upon enjoying social relationships because this is how commonable thoughts are shared between people (Pettit, 1996, p. 180). The implication is that rule-following, essential for thought, rationality, planning, and predicting future events, inextricably involves community involvement. Thus, Pettit develops a social holist solution to Wittgenstein’s problem of rule-following, based on interpersonal communication and feedback regarding the correct understanding of commonable rules. Of course, Pettit grants that it is quite possible that a Robinson Crusoe kind of person, who had social interactions with other people in the past, may follow some rules, intrapersonal or intertemporal, in a particular situation. But how does Crusoe know that the rules which he follows are correct? To know whether the rules are correct, it is required that he had other people around, at least at some point in the past. The nature of social interaction is not random, but regular. A consistent
interpersonal interaction is needed to reveal whether a rule is correct. Interpersonal interactions not only help to identify the errors in rules, but also to eliminate them.

Wittgenstein’s problem of rule-following, to which Pettit proposes a solution, is ultimately about how different people can reach an agreement on the states of affairs that exist in the world. Such agreement is not demanded of a person who lives entirely alone. But in a community, it is crucial. Communities need a set of codes, rules, or principles for agreeing on what is true and who is right since otherwise, they will collapse into anarchy and chaos, with different individuals always at loggerheads (Österberg, 2019, p. vii). In a social world, there are different kinds of shared modes of life, which may range from mutual recognition of two persons to mega societies, from the marital love of a couple to the European Union, from two nations to the United Nations, from sports teams to world wars, from street protests to revolutions, and from electing a leader of a trade union to electing the president of a country (Gilbert, 2014, p. ix, 4). Each shared mode is underpinned by shared assumptions, values, beliefs, interests, and ends.

As we have seen Pettit develops an account of holistic individualism in which people are interdependent individuals, not independent social atoms, and in which they are free to develop social relationships, instead of having their choices determined by top-down social regularities. On his view, that this is so is crucial, not only for the development of such human potentials as that of rationality and our ability to understand and navigate the world, but also for the creation of jointly held commonable thoughts, which he calls a common mind.

In developing his theory of common mind, Pettit endorses both social holism and social individualism, and accordingly rejects both social atomism and social collectivism. He therefore strikes a middle path between two extremes. In accepting social holism, he accepts that we depend on society for our humanity. But in rejecting social collectivism, he denies that social forces have any direct sway over our thoughts and decision-making. A question arises. How can we depend on society for our humanity if social forces play no direct role in determining what we think and do? Pettit’s answer is the prosaic one that society exerts its all-important influences on us through the medium of our ordinary five senses and, in particular, through our ability to understand and converse with each other. Pettit holds a common mind is created by people through social interaction in a community. The idea of the common mind is based on the assumption that at least some contents are commonable. In short, for Pettit, a key condition for the emergence of a common mind, and thus of a fully human mind, is interpersonal interaction in a community. The implication is that fully human minds cannot
develop in isolation. A common mind, Pettit writes, “is a shared or social mind, not an insulated or solipsistic one” (Pettit, 2006, p. 342). So, social interaction creates common minds.

In *Joining the Dots* (2007), Pettit characterises the common mind as objectively existing entity that inheres in aspects of our social interactions. He writes:

We depend on our interactions with one another for the capacity to identify stable guidelines — firm meanings — by which to orientate when we ask what we ought to think in this or that instance. We start from the assumption that, answering to this or that spontaneously mastered word, there is an objective referent available in common to all; and we use one another to triangulate on the identity and implications of that shared concept. Our interactions at this basic level create a tide on which we all rise; resourced by a common fund of interactively tested concepts, we become individually capable of thought and reason. And not only do we depend on one another for the capacity to ratiocinate; we are equally in one another’s debt for the ability to operate as persons, speaking for ourselves and assuming responsibility for our avowals and promises. Without other voices we would lack the reality test needed to establish common intellectual markers; without other ears we would lack the conceptual space needed for becoming commissive creatures, capable of giving our word as from one person to another. Trying to reason or personate out of community with others — out of any community, at any point in one’s life — would be like trying to clap with one hand (Pettit, 2007, p. 336).

There are interesting parallels between Pettit’s notion of a common mind and Giambattista Vico’s notion of common sense. In *Scienza Nuova* (1725), Vico states: “Common sense is judgment without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the whole race” (Vico, 1948, p. 57). Vico’s examples of common-sense judgments include the idea of God’s existence, the idea that there should be an institution of marriage, and the idea that the dead should be buried (Vico, 1948, p. 57). For Vico, these ideas transcend the mind of any particular individual and have a life, or existence, of their own, as judgments that all individuals are apt to have. For Pettit, the common mind transcends the particular mind of any given person in a similar way.

4. The Standard Explanation of Cosmopolitanism

I turn now from Pettit’s theory of the common mind to another, related topic — namely, cosmopolitanism. Terrorism, climate change and pandemic diseases are global challenges which can only be solved through collective action. They are especially difficult challenges to deal with for precisely this reason. Wherever collective action is required, the so-called ‘problem of collective action’ arises, this being the problem of incentivizing all the involved parties to play their part in solving the problem, instead of cheating and freeloadng off the efforts of everyone else.
An early articulation of the problem is the following, by David Hume:

Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because 'tis easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole project. But 'tis very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou'd agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and wou'd lay the whole burden on others (Hume, 1960, p. 538).

Cosmopolitanism is an ideology which, if it wins wide acceptance, would address the problem of collective action, and thereby go far towards fending off many of the great threats that face humanity today. Diogenes is often interpreted as having endorsed cosmopolitanism when, in answer to a question about where he is from, he said: “I am a citizen of the world” (Diogenes, 1969, p. 146). A cosmopolitan person will, like Diogenes, identify themselves, first and foremost, as being a member of a global community of human persons, rather than as a member of any smaller group, such as a nation or a culture.

Cosmopolitanism is standardly said to consist of three principles: individualism, egalitarianism, and universalism. These are now examined in turn. Cosmopolitanism is individualistic in both of two ways. First, in a cosmopolitan society, the individual, not the group, matters. It is human individuals that are the ultimate subjects of moral concern, rather than larger agglomerations of human individuals, such as nation states, or religious institutions, or any other type of human community (Pogge, 2010, p. 114). In the words of Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Cosmopolitanism… starts with what is human in humanity”, where here by ‘what is human’ he means the individual human beings themselves (Appiah, 2006, p. 134). Secondly, cosmopolitanism is individualistic in the sense that, in focusing on individual human beings as the objects of moral concern, it treats as important only their status as human individuals, not their race, or gender, or culture, or religion, or language, or any other attribute that marks some human individuals apart from others. In Why Does Inequality Matter, Scanlon discusses several forms of status inequality, such as the caste system, racial discrimination, and sexual discrimination. He notes that in the world as it stands people of other castes, or other racial groups, or other cultures, are often regarded as “less eligible to be co-workers, potential friends, possible marriage partners, or even neighbours” (Scanlon, 2018, p. 26).
To be a cosmopolitan one must therefore stand ready to combat such prejudices, especially in oneself. As Ulf Hannerz says, one must be ready to “engage with people of other cultures”, and foster in oneself an “ability to understand people of other cultures, through listening, observing, and thinking” (Hannerz, 1990, 239).

Cosmopolitanism is egalitarian in that it aims for a world in which human individuals are not subject to various kinds of inequality. For the cosmopolitan, in an ideal human community property, goods and services would be distributed based on a principle of equality among the members of that community. The cosmopolitan’s commitment to egalitarianism follows naturally from their commitment to individualism, particularly from their commitment to the idea that all human individuals are of equal moral worth.

Universalism means that “persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone”. It stands in opposition to ethical relativism – the idea that what is ethically right can vary between communities – instead holds that the same ethical rule holds for everyone, namely, that all human individuals should be valued, and valued equally, by all human individuals (Pogge, 2010, 114).

To sum up, cosmopolitanism as a social theory holds three theses: first, human individuals rather than groups, nations or states, matter in the social world. Second, all people are equal to one another. Third, every person has a universal worth. These principles provide a foundation for a global society in which people not only share the social world but also create cosmopolitan common minds which, I argue, will enable them to resolve common problems.

5. Framing a Cosmopolitan Common Mind

The question now to be considered is what is required in order for intersubjective agreement on a problematic issue to be reached among persons of different cultures, nationalities or continents in the world. I hold that there is something, at least in principle, which is (or could be) recognised by all human persons across the continents because of common human traits, and the ability of people to be epistemically humble and culturally open. A ‘human person’ refers to a being with a wide range of capacities, including rationality, intentionality, creativity, learning, autonomy, and an ability to communicate and explain themselves. If human persons can recognise something of themselves in each other across the continents, then they have what I call a ‘cosmopolitan common mind’. So understood, the cosmopolitan common mind involves a heightened capacity for intersubjective recognition, above and beyond what is required for the type of common mind of which Petit speaks.
To support my argument that a cosmopolitan common mind can be developed, I use Cass R. Sunstein’s notion of an incompletely theorised agreement. Two examples provided by Sunstein of an incompletely theorised agreement are these. First, people may agree on a general principle that endangered species ought to be protected. However, they may disagree on different justifications of the claim. Some may believe the reasons have to do with our obligations to species, or to nature. Others may believe that preserving biodiversity is essential for ecological stability. Yet others may believe that the reasons lie in the potential value of a species as a source of new medicines. Second, people may agree that the law ought to protect labour unions. However, they may disagree as to whether this is because of the potential democratic role of unions, or their role in maintaining industrial peace, or their role in the protection of basic rights (Sunstein, 1995, p. 1736). More generally, an incompletely theorised agreement exists when people agree on a general principle while not agreeing on all its associated subsidiary claims (Sunstein, 1995, p. 1739).

In arguing that a cosmopolitan common mind is possible, I will also draw on a distinction between cosmopolitan common minds and what I call ‘parochial’ common minds. A parochial common mind is a common mind that exists between persons within certain groups, cultures, religions or races, that is territorial, local, regional, or otherwise limited. This is in contrast to cosmopolitan common mind, which has no such limits, and spans all human individuals. Herder’s and Harriet Martineau’s notions of common minds are consistent with what I call a ‘parochial common mind’. Herder’s idea of Volksgeist, ‘mind of the people’, refers to a common mind among people of a particular group, a society or a nation. In Letter Concerning the Progress of Humanity (1792), Herder explains ‘volksgeist’ as meaning shared “thoughts, dispositions, strivings, and living forces which express themselves in a particular progression of things within given causes and effects” (Herder, 2002, 361). Although this volksgeist is manifested in thoughts, social movements and different states of affairs in social life, it can be difficult to explain, map or paint (Herder, 2002, 361). For explaining his notion of volksgeist, Herder uses an analogy of mind and body: as a body embodies a mind, a society embodies a common mind (Herder, 2002, 361). A common mind of one society may differ from the common minds of other societies. A cosmopolitan common mind will, in stark contrast, transcend national, racial, cultural, religious or linguistic divides.

Like Herder, Martineau’s notion of the common mind is parochial. Martineau argues that institutions and their records manifest particular common minds. In her work, How to Observe Morals and Manners (1836), Martineau states: “The records of any society, be they
what they may, whether architectural remains, epitaphs, civic registers, national music, or any
other of the thousand manifestations of the common mind which may be found among every
people, afford more information on Morals in a day than converse with individuals in a year”
(Martineau, 1838, p. 73-4). Martineau mentions that different social symbols reflect the
common minds of society. She prefers the observation of political, religious and social
institutions to the observation of individuals for acquiring the knowledge of morals of a society.
Thus, Martineau’s notion of the common mind is also parochial.

Virginia Woolf argues that a common mind binds human persons together. If Woolf’s
claim is true that a common mind binds people, a cosmopolitan common mind can bind people
across the continents. She writes: “I think I see for a moment how our minds are all threaded
together — how any live mind today is of the very same stuff as Plato’s & Euripides. It is only
a continuation [and] development of the same thing – It is this common mind that binds the
whole world together; [and] all the world is mind... I feel as though I had grasped the central
meaning of the world, [and] all these poets [and] historians [and] philosophers were only
following out paths branching from that centre in which I stand” (Woolf, 1983, p. 5). Woolf
holds that the social world is undergirded by certain common minds. So, if the social world is
underpinned by divergent common minds, there exists a possibility of a cosmopolitan common
mind which could underpin the people across the continents.

There is a striking similarity between Pettit’s human agency, which he calls holistic
individualism and the cosmopolitan account of human agency. I contend that Pettit’s
standpoint of holistic individualism is compatible with the standard view of cosmopolitanism.
So, I use the expression, ‘cosmopolitan common mind’ to mean an intersubjective recognition
of a claim among persons across the continents. If a claim is recognised across cultures,
nations, horizons or continents, this intersubjective claim is cosmopolitan. I present three
arguments in support of the notion of a cosmopolitan common mind: universal human traits,
intellectual humility and cultural openness.

5.1 Common Human Traits

I argue that common human traits help us access, understand or interpret the nature of
reality almost in the same way. Human persons possess the capabilities of rationality,
conversation, learning, imagination, and memory. They not only develop these traits to a
certain level, but also share similar human experiences, for instance, desiring pleasure, fearing
one’s death, and liking music. These commonalities enable the development of a cosmopolitan
common mind even among individuals who have no possibility of social interaction. I argue
that rational people can discover what is commonable across cultures. Positively, certain things are common to normal human persons, such as striving for life, fearing death, desiring reverence, being hurt by contempt from others, singing, dancing, and enjoying arts.

The assumption is if normal human persons develop certain mental traits, which are similar, they can develop a sense of the world, which is also similar. With common mental traits, human persons can acquire certain common minds in the world. In his work, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*, Kwame Anthony Appiah states:

Cross-cultural analysis reveals that there really are some basic mental traits that are universal—in the sense that they’re normal everywhere. It has also confirmed, for that matter, that some unusual traits—the incapacity to make sense of other people that we call autism—are found in every human population, too. Building on these traits, on our biological natures, cultures produce a great deal of variety, but also much that is the same. Part of the reason for this is that, in culture as in biology, our human environment presents similar problems; and societies, like natural selection, often settle on the same solution because it is the best available (Appiah, 2006, p. 96).

Appiah’s argument holds that basic human traits help make sense of the social world which is common to people. He holds that although biology and culture create diversity, people share many common things. If human persons have the same problems, they need the same solutions. In recent times, the Covid-19 pandemic has caused the same problem for the entire world. Lockdowns, social distancing, masks, and vaccinations are the same preventive solutions to combat the virus.

Normal human persons develop certain mental traits, such as the ability to think, the ability to articulate, and the ability to learn from others. These traits help create common minds, which underpin inter-subjective recognition of some claims in the world. G. K. Chesterton, an English scholar, argues that normal people share something in common with all. Chesterton writes: “The common mind means the mind of all the artists and heroes; or else it would not be common. Plato had the common mind; Dante had the common mind…. Commonness means the quality common to the saint and the sinner, to the philosopher and the fool; … In everybody, there is a certain thing that loves babies, that fears death, that likes sunlight…. And everybody does not mean uneducated crowds; everybody means everybody” (Chesterton, 2001, p. 46-7). Chesterton’s argument of the common mind asserts that ‘commonness’ refers to a particular human quality that exists in all human persons. Due to this quality, people love
babies, fear death, and like sunshine. So, Chesterton argues that commonness in normal people is a human trait. Appiah and Chesterton converge on the idea that there is something that is the same in the human world. According to Appiah, this something is a human trait, while according to Chesterton, this is human nature. Human traits are not independent of human nature. So, one thing is clear: human persons are capable, due to their certain human traits or human nature, of not only sharing the world but also creating inter-subjective recognition of that world.

Rationality is one of the human traits, qualities or potentials, which serves to explore, identify and follow what is commonable, objective and inter-subjective recognition of certain claims. Ralph Waldo Emerson, an American scholar, argues that reason helps people recognise common minds in the world. Emerson states: “There is one mind common to all individual men. Every man is an inlet to the same and to all of the same. He that is once admitted to the right of reason is made a freeman of the whole estate” (Emerson, 1965, p. 123). Emerson adds, “Who hath access to this universal mind is a party to all that is or can be done, for this is the only and sovereign agent” (Emerson, 1965, p. 123). According to Emerson, the reason is the central human trait that makes human persons sovereign agents. Rational agents have access to the universal common mind. So, Emerson’s argument holds that reason helps people explore these universal common minds.

To sum up, the existence of common human traits implies that there could be cosmopolitan common minds in the world. Appiah, Chesterton, and Emerson hold that human nature enables people to acquire particular traits which are common in normal human persons, and which help create common minds. So, universal human traits, such as rationality and conversation help create particular cosmopolitan common minds.

### 5.2 Intellectual Humility

Intellectual humility is essential for reaching a cosmopolitan common mind. It requires people to be fallibilists to reach an inter-subjective recognition of the truth of some claim. ‘Intellectual humility’ means that people’s beliefs might be false and their knowledge is contingent rather than absolute. In Karl Popper’s words, intellectual humility refers to “an attitude of admitting that I may be wrong, and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” (Popper, 2013, 431). This attitude encourages people to compromise their positions to achieve common interests rather than individual interests. In contrast to intellectual humility, intellectual vanity refers to an attitude of the belief that I am right and you are wrong. With this sense of intellectual vanity, people claim that their knowledge is absolutely true and
there is no possibility of compromising their positions. Popper narrates a personal incident that helps explain the distinction between intellectual humility and intellectual vanity. Popper states that once he encountered an agent of the National Socialist Party, who talked to him, “What, you want to argue? I don't argue, I shoot” (Popper, 1994, xiii). The activist of the Nationalist Social Party has no intellectual humility and he has no will to reach an agreement. Thus, intellectual humility supports inter-subjective recognition of the truth of some claims.

Intellectual vanity causes intellectual relativism which refers to the idea that truth is not universal because it depends upon different intellectual frameworks. Popper explains the thesis of relativism that there is an “impossibility of mutual understanding between different cultures, generations, or historical periods, even within science, even within physics” (Popper, 1994, 33). This thesis of intellectual relativism is known as the myth of the framework. Popper argues that this myth is based on an assumption: “A rational and fruitful discussion is impossible unless the participants share a common framework of basic assumptions, or, at least unless they are agreed on such as a framework for … the discussion” (1994, 34-5). Intellectual relativism is detrimental because it creates divisions among people, and by so doing it increases violence in the world (Popper, 1994). Instead, intellectual humility helps recognise the cosmopolitan common minds to bring about agreements on the claims which have conflicts.

Intellectual humility creates a certain level of fallibilism, which help people to learn from one another. Popper argues that if there are no common assumptions [between people of different frameworks, there] “may perhaps be … common problems. For different groups of humans do, as a rule, have much in common, such as the problems of survival” (Popper, 1994, 38). Problem of survival common problem to all human persons. So, intellectual humility provides the opportunity of knowing other cultures, frameworks or worldviews which helps develop inter-subjective recognition of the truth of some claim.

5.3 Cultural Openness

Cultural openness is another gateway to developing a cosmopolitan common mind. Openness in mind is a prerequisite of cultural openness. ‘Intercultural access’ means that people in different cultures can understand each other (in certain ways). Pettit argues that cultural openness provides access to intercultural relationships, which helps people acquire commonality across different cultures (Pettit, 1996). Cultural openness cannot be possible if there is no commonability among different cultures. It can be taken for granted that there are other human persons in distant cultures; the people in those cultures have different knowledge, which means that there is nothing commonable among them. Can some position be occupied,
at least in principle, which would enable these separate cultures to identify, at least in principle, what is common among them? I agree with Pettit that commonality is necessary for cultural openness because it makes several shared activities possible, such as conversation and sports.

The conversation is a human attribute. Conversation is essential for intercultural access. Appiah argues that “regular conversation with one another across the boundaries of race, religion, tribe, and nationality” helps people understand one another (2017, p. 272). In a cosmopolitan society, people make conversation with people of other cultures which helps them reach inter-subjective recognition of a particular claim. However, as Appiah claims, “Cosmopolitans suppose that all cultures have enough overlap in their vocabulary of values to begin a conversation” (Appiah, 2006, p. 57). If cultures share common values, the conversation helps identify those values among their cultures. So, conversation supports cultural openness.

To sum up, the existence of a cosmopolitan common mind depends upon certain human capacities, such as rationality, conversation, and other cognitive faculties. The arguments based on universal human traits, intellectual humility, and cultural openness explain the possibility of creating cosmopolitan common minds in different ways. The existence of universal human traits means that people can understand and share the world. Intellectual humility supports rationality, and the rational attitude helps reach inter-subjective recognitions across cultures, religions, or continents. Cultural openness supports conversation between people of different cultures, which in turn enables inter-subjective recognition. Thus, rationality, conversation and other cognitive faculties, such as the ability to create accurate explanations of other people’s actions, bring about cosmopolitan common minds as inter-subjective recognitions across different cultures, religions, and intellectual frameworks.

6. Conclusion

This article posited an account of a cosmopolitan common mind, which could be considered a prerequisite for resolving global challenges, such as peaceful coexistence and good ecology. I drew the notion of a cosmopolitan common mind from Pettit’s theory of the common mind and the standard view of cosmopolitanism. Pettit argues that the existence of a common mind depends upon social interaction in a community. A common mind, Pettit argues, is a shared mind (Pettit, 1996). Pettit’s claim is, I believe, highly plausible, but there is a question of whether this common mind can be cosmopolitan as opposed to merely parochial (or local, or national). For instance, university clubs, sports teams, political parties, and nation-states develop particular common minds. In contrast, the idea of ‘cosmopolitan common mind’ refers to something that is commonable in the sense that it involves intersubjective recognition.
across the peoples of the whole globe. I have argued that a cosmopolitan common mind is possible because of common human traits, epistemic humility, and cultural openness. The standard account of cosmopolitanism has three central principles: individualism, egalitarianism, and universalism. Like Pettit’s holistic individuals, cosmopolitan individuals require anti-collectivistic and anti-atomist dispositions to create cosmopolitan common minds.

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7. References


